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Cuando las alternativas sobre las que se vota son fijas, la regla de la pluralidad es 
criticada por ser capaz de seleccionar una alternativa considerada como peor por 
una mayoría estricta. En este artículo consideramos una elección con no más de 
tres alternativas endógenas. En contraste con el caso de alternativas fijas, 
mostramos que la regla de la pluralidad es la única regla de votación, entre todas 
las reglas de votación basadas en métodos de puntuación, que siempre selecciona 
la alternativa ganadora de Condorcet.  
 
Palabras clave: Reglas de puntuación; Ciudadano-candidato; Consistencia en 




Plurality rule, when applied to a fixed agenda setting, is mostly criticized from being 
capable of choosing an alternative considered as worst by a strict majority. In this 
paper we consider an endogenous agenda setting with no more than three 
alternatives. In those equilibria where the Condorcet winner enters the contest, we 
show, in direct contrast to the fixed agenda case, that Plurality rule is the only 
scoring rule which always elects the Condorcet winner. 
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 1 Introduction
In some voting processes, a previous announcement of candidates or policy
choices usually takes place. When it occurs, the agenda consists of potential
candidates strategically choosing whether or not to enter the election. This is
the case for instance, of the primaries in some political parties, the elections
of representative members (as the head of some state universities, some labor
unions), the election of a policy by a committee, etc.
These voting procedures have in common that can be viewed as a two-
stage process. In the ﬁrst stage or entry-decision stage the voting alternatives
or candidates are self-declared and in a second stage, a voting rule elects one
of these alternatives.
Osborne and Slivinski [10] and Besley and Coate [1] provide the ﬁrst anal-
ysis of this type of scenario. Subsequently, Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton
[4] show that the outcome of every non-dictatorial and unanimous1 voting
procedure is modiﬁed by the strategic candidacy, i.e., the strategic behavior
at the entry-decision stage. Therefore, exploring the equilibrium outcome of
some commonly used voting rules when we account for strategic candidacy,
has become an important issue. In this direction, Dutta, Jackson and Le Bre-
ton [5] explore the properties of the successive elimination voting procedure
when the agenda is determined endogenously. They ﬁnd that the strategic
candidacy provides, in direct contrast to the ﬁxed agenda case, equilibrium
outcomes which include Pareto dominated alternatives.
The Condorcet consistency criterion certainly is the most commonly used
principle for evaluating alternative voting rules. In an election, an alternative
x is a Condorcet winner (Condorcet [2]) when every other alternative is
beaten by x in a series of pairwise comparisons by majority rule. Thus, the
Condorcet consistency criterion requires the election of the Condorcet winner
when such an alternative exists. While a Condorcet winner may not always
exists, there are some particular domains of preferences (as single-peaked
preferences) for which we can guarantee its existence.
In a ﬁxed agenda case, a well known result is that every scoring rule
violates the Condorcet consistency criterion. The scoring rules (among which
P l u r a l i t yr u l ea n dB o r d ar u l ea r et h eb e s tk n o w n )a r eac l a s so fv o t i n gr u l e s
where the winner is determined by computing a score that depends on the
1Ignoring candidate’s preferences for themselves, a voting rule satisﬁes unanimity if
whenever a candidate which is most preferred by all voters to whatever competitors that
it has exists, then the voting rule elects such candidate.
1rank of the alternatives in the voters’ preference orders.
In a previous paper Moreno and Puy [8] explore, in the domain of single-
peaked preferences, the Condorcet-consistency property of Plurality rule when
the agenda is determined endogenously. We there ﬁnd that strategic candi-
dacy provides, in direct contrast to the ﬁxed agenda case, equilibrium out-
comes which satisfy Condorcet consistency in every three-candidate election.
In this paper we aim at exploring the eﬀects of strategic candidacy on the
set of all the scoring rules. Thus, when the candidates are endogenous, we
aim at evaluating all the scoring rules in terms of Condorcet consistency. We
therefore consider ﬁnite sets of voters endowed with single-peaked preferences
which are deﬁned on a one-dimensional policy space. We then examine the
equilibrium outcomes of the two-stages voting game when there is no more
than three potential candidates. While in Moreno and Puy [8]’ paper there
is no restriction on the set of potential candidates, in this paper we take into
a c c o u n tt h a tm o s te l e c t i o n st a k ep l a c ea m o n gt h r e ec a n d i d a t e ss ot h a tw e
restrict the set of potential candidates to three.
As in a ﬁxed alternative election, we ﬁrstly ﬁnd that no scoring rule
satisﬁes Condorcet consistency. We then propose a weaker property that we
call Candidacy Condorcet Consistency which requires electing the Condorcet
winner whenever the Condorcet winner alternative enters the race. We then
ﬁnd that Plurality rule is the only scoring rule which satisﬁes this property.
Thus, from a comparison of the properties satisﬁed by the scoring rules in a
ﬁxed agenda election as opposed to the properties satisﬁed in an endogenous
agenda election, we ﬁnd pretty diﬀerent conclusions. While Plurality rule
a p p l i e di naﬁxed agenda setting is mostly criticized from being capable of
choosing an alternative considered as worst by a strict majority, when we
consider an endogenous agenda setting with no more than three candidates,
Plurality rule is the only scoring rule which always elects the Condorcet
winner alternative whenever this alternative enters the contest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
model, Section 3 states the results and Section 4 just makes some concluding
remarks.
2M o d e l
Candidates and Voters
Let N = {1,...,n} be any ﬁnite set of voters, where n is an odd number.
2Let A = {a,b,c} where A ⊂ N be the set of potential candidates. We
assume that the three candidates are diﬀerent and that σ =( a,b,c) is an
ordering of the elements of A.
We assume that voters have strict single-peaked preferences over the set
of candidates with respect to the ordering σ. The preference relation of i is
denoted by Pi.W es a yt h a taRib if either aPib or a = b.L e tPσ denote the
set of single-peaked proﬁles with respect to σ and P denotes a generic proﬁle
in Pσ. Four groups of preference rankings are then possible that we denote
by n1,n 2,n 3,n 4:
n1 n2 n3 n4
a b b c
b a c b
c c a a
We consider that n1,n 2,n 3,n 4 indicate the number of voters with each
of the preference rankings. A generic proﬁle P can be then described as a
vector where P =( n1,n 2,n 3,n 4).
Given any C ⊂ A,l e tPi |C denote the binary relation on C induced by
Pi and P |C the proﬁle of induced relations.
We assume that candidates are ideological, which requires that a candi-
date ﬁnds himself most preferred and that he prefers those candidates which
are closer to him. Thus, as Pa,P b,P c ∈ Pσ, we have that candidate a is of
type n1, candidate b is either of type n2 or n3, and ﬁnally candidate c is of
type n4. We also consider that every candidate strictly prefers an element of
A to the situation where no candidate is elected.
Scoring Rules
When the set of candidates is C = A,l e ts =( 1 ,w,0) be a vector of
scores such that w ∈ [0,1]. And when the set of candidates C ⊂ A is such
that #C =2 , the vector of scores is given by s =( 1 ,0).2
A scoring rule is a function Sw :2 A\∅×Pσ → A such that for all C ⊆ A
and P ∈ Pσ each voter gives a score to each candidate, and the total score
of a candidate is obtained summing up the scores given by all voters to this
candidate. The candidate elected by a scoring rule Sw(C,P) ∈ C,i st h e
one obtaining the greatest score. Some of the best known scoring rules are
2Note that in two-candidate elections, all the scoring rules coincide with Majority rule.
3Plurality rule and Borda rule. We denote Plurality rule by S0 since its vector
o fs c o r e si sd e ﬁned for w =0and we denote Borda rule by S1
2 since the vector
of scores is deﬁned for w = 1
2.
A scoring rule chooses a candidate from the set of available candidates.
The candidate elected by a scoring rule just depends on the voters’ prefer-
ences over the set of feasible candidates. We shall consider that voters give
scores to the candidate in a sincere way and that in case of ties a deterministic
tie-breaking rule chooses one of the candidates.
Equilibrium Concept in an Endogenous Election
The electoral mechanism that we propose follows two stages. In the ﬁrst
stage or entry decision stage, each potential candidate announces whether or
not he wants to become candidate. This entry stage determines the set of
self-declared candidates C ⊆ A. In a second stage, given a vector of scores
which is deﬁned for some w ∈ [0,1], each voter gives a score to each of the
candidates in C, and the candidate obtaining the greatest score becomes the
winning candidate.
We shall consider that the entry decision is the only strategic decision
made by the potential candidates.3 Thus, the equilibrium concept that we
consider at the entry stage is Nash equilibrium. We deﬁne an entry equilib-
rium as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 We say that C ⊆ A is an entry equilibrium relative to Sw
and P ∈ Pσ if Sw(C,P)RjSw(C\{j},P) for all j ∈ C and Sw(C,P)RjSw(C∪
{j},P) for all j ∈ A\C.
Thus, an entry equilibrium C requires that on the one hand no candidate
in C strictly improves withdrawing from a contest and on the other hand
that no candidate in A\C strictly improves entering the race.
3 Condorcet Consistency
We say that candidate j defeats candidate k in pairwise comparison if a
strict majority of voters prefers j over k.
The Condorcet winner that we denote by m,w h e r em ∈ A is the
candidate that defeats every other candidate in pairwise comparisons.
3This assumption is also made by Osborne and Slivinsky [10]. Besley and Coate [1]
assume however that voting is strategic.
4Since we have assumed single-peaked preferences and the number of can-
didates is considered to be odd, the Condorcet winner can be always deﬁned
and it is unique. Furthermore, the Condorcet winner coincides with the
median voter’s most preferred candidate.
Following Moulin [9], we deﬁne the property of Condorcet Consistency as
follows:
Deﬁnition 2 A scoring rule Sw satisﬁes Condorcet Consistency if in
every entry equilibrium C,w eh a v et h a tSw(C,P)=m for every P ∈ Pσ.
I.e., a scoring rule is Condorcet Consistent if every entry equilibrium is
such that the Condorcet winner is elected.
From the set of all the scoring rules, we ﬁrstly analyze what rules satisfy
Condorcet Consistency.
Theorem 1 In an endogenous election, there is no scoring rule which sat-
isﬁes Condorcet Consistency for all P ∈ Pσ.
Proof. For all Sw where w ∈ [0,1] we next show, in the following two
claims, that there exists P ∈ Pσ and an entry equilibrium C such that
Sw(C,P) 6= m.
Claim 1: Plurality rule is such that S0(C,P) 6= m for some entry equilib-
rium C and some P ∈ Pσ.
Let P =( 2 ,1,0,2) and consider that C = {a,c}. We then have that S0(C,P)=
a whereas the Condorcet winner is b. Since no candidate in C has incentives
to withdraw, and b cannot win the election by means of entering the race, C
is an entry equilibrium.
Claim 2: Every scoring rule Sw where w ∈ (0,1] is such that Sw(C,P) 6= m
for some entry equilibrium C and some P ∈ Pσ.
Let P =( n1,0,n 3,n 4) where n1,n 3,n 4 > 0 and consider that C = A. Then,
for every w ∈ (0,1],S w(C,P)=b if the following conditions (1) and (2)
hold:
n3 + w(n1 + n4) >n 1 (1)
n3 + w(n1 + n4) >w n 3 + n4 (2)
However, if the following condition (3) holds, candidate a is the Condorcet
winner:
n1 >n 3 + n4 (3)
5N o t et h a ti n e q u a l i t i e s( 1 )a n d( 3 )i m p l i e s( 2 ) .W en e x ts h o wt h a ts o m ev o t i n g
numbers can be assigned such that inequalities (1) and (3) are satisﬁed.











> 0 and n4 = nε
2,w h e r e
ε > 0 and close enough to zero and where n is the total number of voters.4






Therefore, for all w ∈ (0,1] and for ε < w
3−2w,t h en u m b e ro fv o t e r sn is
chosen such that inequalities (1) and (3) are satisﬁed, which implies that
b is elected by every scoring rule Sw where w ∈ (0,1], whereas a is the
Condorcet winner. It is clear that candidate b has no incentives to withdraw.
Furthermore, neither a nor c can improve withdrawing since then b becomes
their most preferred candidate, so that C is an entry equilibrium.
The above Theorem provides two counterexamples of entry equilibria
showing that in an endogenous election all the scoring rules can fail to elect
the Condorcet winner. Since Theorem 1 provides a negative result which con-
siders a domain of voters with single-peaked preferences, it can be extended
to an unrestricted domain of preferences.
As it is shown in the proof, there are some entry equilibria where two
candidates enter the contest that illustrate that Plurality rule does not sat-
isfy Condorcet Consistency. The reason for this is that in equilibrium the
Condorcet winner does not become candidate.
For all the scoring rules but Plurality rule, the counterexample that we
provide considers an entry equilibrium where the three potential candidates
in A enter the race. We then show that for a particular proﬁle of preferences
the Condorcet winner is not elected.
Taking into account that in an endogenous context the Condorcet winner
may not become candidate, we next deﬁne a weaker concept of Condorcet
Consistency as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 As c o r i n gr u l eSw satisﬁes Candidacy Condorcet Consis-
tency if in every entry equilibrium C where m ∈ C,w eh a v et h a tSw(C,P)=
m for every P ∈ Pσ.
4Note that for n suﬃciently large, the voting numbers can be obtained as integer
numbers.
6Thus, a scoring rule is Candidacy Condorcet Consistent if in every en-
try equilibrium where the Condorcet winner enters the race, the Condorcet
winner is elected.
Since all the scoring rules fail to satisfy Condorcet Consistency, we sec-
ondly analyze what scoring rules satisfy Candidacy Condorcet Consistency.
Theorem 2 In an endogenous election, Plurality rule is the only scoring
rule which satisﬁes Candidacy Condorcet Consistency for all P ∈ Pσ.
Proof. We make the proof in two steps:
Step 1: We ﬁrstly show that Plurality rule is Candidacy Condorcet Consis-
tent. Depending on C, we distinguish three cases:
Case 1: If the entry equilibrium is such that C = {m},w et h e nh a v et h a t
S0(C,P)=m for every P ∈ Pσ.
Case 2: If the entry equilibrium is such that C = A\{j} where j 6= m, we
then have that the Condorcet winner defeats in pairwise comparisons every
other candidate so that S0(C,P)=m for every P ∈ Pσ.
Case 3: If the entry equilibrium is such that C = A, three cases can be then
distinguished:
3.1):I f S0(C,P)=a, it implies that n1 >n 2 + n3 and n1 >n 4 so that
either candidate a or b can be the Condorcet winner. If b is the Condorcet
winner we have that Plurality rule may not satisfy Candidacy Condorcet
Consistency since S0(C,P) 6= b. In this case however, we ﬁnd that can-
didate c has incentives to withdraw since then S0(C\{c},P)=b so that
S0(C\{c},P)PcS0(C,P) which contradicts that C is an entry equilibrium.
It then implies that in every entry equilibrium where S0(C,P)=a we have
that a is the Condorcet winner.
3.2):I fS0(C,P)=b, it implies that P should be such that n2+n3 >n 1 and
n2 + n3 >n 4 so that neither a nor c can be the Condorcet winner. Thus, b
is the Condorcet winner, and then S0(C,P)=m.
3.3):I fS0(C,P)=c, this case is symmetric (but equivalent) to that in 3.1)
then, a similar argument shows that c should necessarily be the Condorcet
winner.
Step 2: We secondly show that for all Sw such that w ∈ (0,1] there exists
P ∈ Pσ such that Sw(C,P) 6= m for some entry equilibrium C where m ∈ C.
It directly follows from the counterexample of Claim 2 in Theorem 1.5
5Notice that the counterexample of Claim 2 considers an entry equilibrium C where
C = A, so that it directly follows that m ∈ C.
7As we show, the only entry equilibrium where Plurality rule fails to elect
the Condorcet winner is such that two candidates enter the contest and none
of them is the Condorcet winner. Therefore, when we restrict attention
to those entry equilibria where the Condorcet winner becomes candidate, we
ﬁnd that Plurality rule elects the Condorcet winner. For all the other scoring
rules however, some entry equilibria always exist such that either candidate
a or c are Condorcet winners whereas candidate b is the elected candidate.
As we next show in the following remarks, two assumptions are crucial
for the results in Theorem 2: single-peaked preferences and restricting the
set of potential candidates to three.
Remark 1 If preferences are not single-peaked, Plurality rule in an endoge-
nous election fails to satisfy Candidacy Condorcet Consistency.
To prove this statement consider that the preferences of voters in group n3
are cPiaPib and that the preferences of candidate b are of type n2. Then, let
C = A be the set of candidates and P =( 4 ,5,3,1) be a generic proﬁle. It
then follows that candidate a is the Condorcet winner whereas candidate b is
elected by Plurality rule. Then, we ﬁnd that no candidate can strictly improve
withdrawing so that C is an entry equilibrium.
Remark 2 If there are four or more potential candidates, Plurality rule in
an endogenous election fails to satisfy Candidacy Condorcet Consistency.
Let A0 = {a,b,c,d} be the set of potential candidates. For C = A0 some
generic proﬁles can be deﬁned where b is a Condorcet winner, and C is an
entry equilibrium where candidate a is elected by Plurality rule (see for in-
stance Moreno and Puy [8], Example 2).
4C o n c l u s i o n s
While the property of Condorcet Consistency has been criticized by Dum-
mett [3] and Saari [12] as it is a too strong requirement, these authors justify
introducing some less restrictive requirements. In this way, several alterna-
tive criteria have been proposed in a ﬁxed agenda election (see for instance
Fishburn and Gehrlein [6], Lepelley and Merlin [7] and more recently Sanver
[13]) to deepen into the analysis of voting rules. While in an exogenous alter-
native election these authors come up with additional properties, no property
has been proposed so far in the analysis of endogenous alternative elections.
8With this paper, we provide a ﬁrst step showing that, as in a ﬁxed agenda
election, no scoring rule satisﬁes Condorcet Consistency when the agenda is
endogenously determined. As a weaker property we have introduced the
concept of Candidacy Condorcet Consistency. While no scoring rule satisﬁes
this property in an ﬁxed agenda setting, we show that Plurality rule is the
only scoring rule which satisﬁes this property when the agenda is endogenous.
This result, that is stated in Theorem 2, constitutes therefore an argument
in favor of Plurality rule.
As it is shown in Remarks 1 and 2 however, Theorem 2 holds under certain
conditions: single-peaked preferences and a number of potential candidates
no greater than three. While these conditions seem restrictive, we believe
that in many voting scenarios they do are satisﬁed. In particular, we think of
voting scenarios where the candidates can be aligned along a single dimension
(see some empirical evidence in Poole and Rosenthal [11]) and where no more
than three proposals compose the endogenous agenda (as in many primary
elections).
While our results establishes a ﬁrst step in the study of the scoring rules in
an endogenous election, we think that analysis which incorporate additional
properties as well as additional voting rules deserve further research.
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